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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(a), this matter involving a final order resulting 
from adjudicative proceedings of the Division of Peace Officer 
Standards and Training, Department of Public Safety. Jurisdiction 
is also based on Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-12 and 63-46b-14 and Utah Administrative Code 
§ R728-409-23. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether agency staff can dismiss, on the merits, a citizen 
complaint initiating formal adjudicative proceedings, without 
requiring an answer, without hearing, without taking evidence and 
without entering findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
without a decision on the merits by a "presiding officer." 
2. Whether findings by a district court judge that a peace 
officer acted without probable cause, and filed statements under 
oath which were "riddled with untruths" may be ignored or reversed 
in agency proceedings within the limits of the doctrines res 
judicata, collateral estoppel and law of the case. 
3. Whether adjudicated perjury, and uncontrovertible falsi-
fication of public documents, must be referred by the agency to 
the appropriate prosecutorial authority. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
On review of an order dismissing a complaint, this Court 
accepts the material allegations of the complaint as true and 
affirms only if the facts alleged fail to state a claim for which 
relief can be granted. Prows v. State, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 
(Utah 1991); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 
811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 
P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
When reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of 
general law, this court applies a correction of error standard of 
review, giving no deference to the agency's interpretation. In 
re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah App. 1988) citing Department of 
Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 
1983) . 
On review of a summary judgment, this Court accords no 
deference to rulings on either the facts or the law and every 
burden is on the appellee. An appellate court 
consider[s] the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and affirm[s] 
only where it appears there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material issues of fact, or 
where, even according the facts as contended by 
the losing party, the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Themy v. 
Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 626, 628-29 
(Utah 1979). 
Accord., Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah App. 
1989); Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah App. 
1988); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah App. 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This case involves construction of the following provision of 
the Peace Officer Training Code, Utah Code Ann. § 67-15-2.1: 
The Division of Peace Officer Standards and 
Training shall comply with the procedures and 
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its 
adjudicative proceedings. 
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and the following provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et. seq.): 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(l), effective April 1, 
1992: 
. . . except as otherwise provided by a statute 
superseding provisions of this chapter by 
explicit reference to this chapter, the 
provisions of this chapter apply to every agency 
of the state of Utah and govern: 
(a) all state agency actions that determine the 
legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or 
other legal interests of one or more identifiable 
persons, including all agency actions to grant, 
deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw or 
amend an authority, right, or license . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4) concerning summary disposition: 
(4) This chapter does not preclude . . . 
the presiding officer during an adjudicative 
proceeding from: 
* • * 
(b) granting a timely motion to dis-
miss or for summary judgment if the 
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, 
respectively, of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are met by the moving party, 
except to the extent that the require-
ments of those rules are modified by 
this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(1)(h)(i), defining "presiding 
officer": 
Presiding officer means an agency head, or an 
individual or body of individuals designated 
by the agency head, by the agency's rules, or 
by statute to conduct an adjudicative 
proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a) permitting initiation of 
adjudicative proceedings by Complaint: 
Where the law applicable to the agency permits 
persons other than the agency to initiate 
adjudicative proceedings, that person's request 
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for agency action shall be in writing and 
signed by the person invoking the jurisdiction 
of the agency, or by his representative, and 
shall include: 
(i) the names and addresses of all persons to 
whom a copy of the request for agency action is 
being sent; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other 
reference number, if known; 
(iii) the date that the request for agency 
action was mailed; 
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and 
jurisdiction under which agency action is 
requested; 
(v) a statement of the relief or action 
sought from the agency, and 
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons 
forming the basis for relief or agency action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d) requiring notice in adjudicative 
A 
proceedings: ^ ' 
The presiding officer shall promptly review a 
request for agency action and shall: 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that 
the request is granted and that the adjudicative 
proceeding is completed; 
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing 
that the request is denied and, if the proceeding 
is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that the 
party may request a hearing before the agency to 
challenge the denial; or 
(iii) notify the requesting party that further 
proceedings are required to determine the 
agency's response to the request. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-3v(e) and 63-46b-5 (1) (i) defining the 
contents of notice of denial of adjudicative proceedings: 
(i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) 
shall contain the information required by 
Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to 
disclosure required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) of 
this section. 
• * * * 
Within a reasonable time after the close of an 
informal adjudicative proceeding [or denial of 
a formal proceeding under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-3(d)(ii)], the presiding officer shall 
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issue a signed order in writing that states the 
following: 
(i) the decision; 
(ii) the reasons for the decision; 
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative 
or judicial review available to the parties; and 
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or 
requesting a review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8T requiring due process and basic 
fairness: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the 
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure 
of relevant facts and to afford all the parties 
reasonable opportunity to present their 
positions. 
and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 providing for judicial review: 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial 
review of final agency action. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of Respondent, Dale Gurley ("Gurley" 
herein), a peace officer, conducting an illegal search and seizure 
of Appellant's property, then preparing false reports of his 
conduct to give it an appearance of propriety and filing a false 
statement under oath with the Third District Court for Tooele 
County to conceal the wrongfulness of his conduct; and the refusal 
of Respondent, Division of Peace Officer Standards and Training 
("POST") to (1) hold hearings on Gurley's conduct, allow 
Petitioner to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, (2) 
discipline Gurley, and/or (3) refer his perjury to the appropriate 
prosecutorial authorities. 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
Appellant filed a Complaint with POST on September 3, 1991, 
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containing, seriatim, all of the elements required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a). The Complaint was pursuant to Utah 
Administrative Code § R728-409-5B-6,^ permitting a citizen to 
file a "complaint . . . which on its face appears to [state] a 
violation of section 409-3 [viz., states misconduct by a peace 
officer which would reflect badly on law enforcement]." 
B. Disposition by POST. 
No notice was issued by POST pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-3»(e) (iii) requiring Gurley to answer, or granting 
Petitioner's request for a hearing. Instead of requiring an 
answer, the Director of POST and its Certification Bureau Chief 
issued a letter (the "Order" herein) on May 6, 1992, the effect of 
which was either to dismiss the complaint or grant summary 
judgment on all factual and legal questions in Gurley's favor. 
The letter of POST at R. 0250 declares, unequivocally, that "the 
decision of POST [is] to close this case with no action to be 
taken." 
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration, 
demanding a hearing and asserting that the Order was an improper 
adjudication of facts under the Administrative Procedures Act and 
the Administrative Code, that the Order failed to include findings 
and conclusions or a right of appeal and that the procedure 
followed denied due process, including the right to present 
evidence. The motion for reconsideration was deemed denied under 
1Thc Complaint was pursuant to Utah Administrative Coda | R715-409-5B-6, as in effect in 
1991, which has been redesignated f R728-409-5B-6 (1992), but is unchanged. For convenience, 
and to avoid confusion, references vill be to the current numbering. 
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provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) on June 3, 1992, by 
reason of POST failing to act thereon in any way. Petition for 
Writ of Review was filed on June 4, 1992. 
C. Proceedings Herein. 
Respondent Gurley moved for summary disposition on the theory 
that there was no "final order" on July 2, 1992, which motion was 
denied by order of the Honorable Norman H. Jackson on October 13, 
1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts alleged in the Verified Complaint-' have 
not been denied or controverted. 
On September 8, 1990, Gurley forcibly entered a locked bird 
pen belonging to Petitioner, which was part of a licensed game 
farm associated with property leased by Petitioner, together with 
Messrs. Leslie Foote and Roy N. Byrd, pursuant to Special Use 
Lease Agreement No. 798 with the State of Utah, Division of State 
Lands and Forestry, released or took live Chukar, purchased from a 
licensed game farm, game bird feeders, game bird feed, bands 
purchased from DWR, and watering devices, rendering the premises 
unusable as a private wildlife farm. (Complaint R. 0037, Ex. A at 
R. 0017.) Gurley made no arrest of Petitioner, including by 
issuance of any citation for any alleged violation of law and 
obtained no warrant for the search of the premises or seizure of 
The Verified Complaint was not indexed in the Record prepared by POST, but appears at 
R. 0034, following exhibits to the Complaint vhich are out of order but appear at R. 0011 
through R. 0033. The allegations of the Verified Complaint are under oath, and its exhibits 
consist of verified documents and orders of the Third District Court. The Verified Complaint 
and its exhibits are thus uncontroverted facts herein. 
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any property therein on September 8, 1990, or at any time prior 
thereto or thereafter. (Complaint R. 0037, Ex. D at R. 0067.) 
Gurley knew, however, that the bird pen "belonged to 'Parker the 
dog trainer' who was an attorney," that his name was Parker 
Nielson and that he lived in Salt Lake City, and that "Parker the 
dog trainer" was staying in "a trailer behind the Vernon store," 
having been informed of those facts by both Douglas Larson and 
Charlie Larson, cattle ranchers operating the same lands leased by 
Petitioner. (Complaint R. 0037, admitted in Gurley's report at R. 
0004.) 
Petitioner and his co-lessees, acting by and through Leslie 
Foote, held a Certificate of Registration for a Private Wildlife 
Farm issued by DWR, No. PWF-SLO-129, at T.9S., R.6W., SLB&M, Sec. 
15, 16, 22, Tooele Co., inclusive of the lands embraced by Lease 
No. 798. (Complaint R. 0038, Ex. A at R. 0012.) Said lease and 
said wildlife farm permit were issued for the specific purpose of 
"releasing and propagating gamebirds for hunting dog training and 
conducting non-commercial competition of hunting dogs." 
(Complaint R. 0038, Ex. A at R. 0013.) During the entire time 
alleged Petitioner had in his possession copies of the permit and 
a bill of sale documenting the purchase of the live game birds 
from a lawful source and Gurley has admitted that copies of the 
permit were available to him at his office. (Complaint R. 0038, 
Ex. A at R. 0016.) 
Gurley knew that it was lawful to possess live game birds 
pursuant to a Certificate of Registration and to use them for dog 
training, but made no request that Petitioner exhibit any 
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documentation or authority. (Complaint R. 0038, Ex. A at R. 0017 
at Ex. D at R. 0067) Petitioner was well known to Gurley since 
1986 and an Affidavit was filed with POST establishing that Gurley 
had pursued a campaign to interfere with all dog training 
activities, those of Petitioner in particular, since 1986. (See 
Complaint R. 0042 and Affidavit of Deputy Sheriff Dan Taylor 
reciting Gurley's threats to do so at R. 0085.) 
Petitioner discovered that Gurley had destroyed the bird pen 
and taken his property four days later, on September 12, 1990 and 
initiated civil suit against Gurley. (R. 0039 and copy of the 
Verified Complaint at R. 0011.) 
Gurley made no report of his destruction of Petitioner's bird 
pen and taking of his property, and gave Petitioner no notice of 
his conduct or any claim that it was pursuant to law enforcement 
authority until after the civil suit was initiated. (R. 0039.) 
Upon being served with process, Gurley embarked on a pattern of 
conduct involving falsification of documents and perjury in an 
effort to conceal his wrongful conduct. Gurley backdated an 
investigative report. (R. 0039.) Although it is dated September 
8, 1990, the "report" bears Petitioner's office address, which 
Gurley admitted he copied from the summons served on him on 
September 13, 1990, and refers to "release of purchased Chukars," 
although Gurley claimed that he believed the birds were "wild" 
until being served with process. Gurley's Affidavit reveals, 
conclusively, that the report was backdated as follows: 
I did not finalize my report on the bird [pen] 
until September 13, 1990, when I was served 
with a Summons in this lawsuit. Prior to that 
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date I had made field notes of my investigation 
and made sketches of the bird [pen]. I 
finalized my report on September 13, 1990, 
because I learned, through the service of the 
Summons on me, that Plaintiff was the one who 
owned the bird fpen]." (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 0039.) 
In a further effort to conceal his wrongful conduct, Gurley 
fabricated, forged or falsified a "citation" against Petitioner 
and attached it to his Affidavit, stating under oath, that "I 
issued a citation to Plaintiff on or about September 13, 1990 by 
mailing it to him." (R. 0040.) No citation was ever issued and 
the fabricated document was never mailed to Petitioner. It is 
conclusive that the citation is a fabrication, or forgery, because 
Gurley had previously statedr under oath in Answers filed with the 
Court on on October 22, 1990, copies of which are attached to the 
Complaint, that he "made no arrest of Plaintiff, including by 
issuance of any citation for any alleged violation of law, on 
September 8, 1990, or at any time thereafter . . . " (R. 0040. 
See also Exhibit "D" to the Complaint, Response to Request No. 7 
at R. 0067.) It is conclusive that the fabricated "citation" was 
never "issued," for the certificate of the Clerk of the Circuit 
Court for Tooele County establishes that no such "citation" was 
ever filed with the Court. (R. 0040. The Clerk's certificate is 
Ex. E at R. 0106.) Moreover, Gurley's sworn Affidavit quoted 
above confirms that he prepared it after service of summons on 
him. (R. 0040.) Gurley himself admitted in his Answers to 
Plaintiff's Fourth Request for Admissions by Gurley dated November 
1, 1991, that the "citation" attached to said Affidavit dated 
April 18, 1991, was in fact spurious, and without any validity or 
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effect (See answer to Request for Admission No. 6 at R. 0177-0178) 
and admitted to POST at R. 0244 that he never had any intent to 
issue a citation. 
Partial Summary Judgment was entered against Gurley by the 
Honorable David S. Young on June 24, 1991, a copy of which is 
attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B". (R. 0099-0104.) Judge 
Young held that Gurley acted without probable cause and that his 
conduct was unlawful. (R. 0103.) Judge Young also held that 
Petitioner's conduct was lawful and that the proper procedure for 
a law enforcement officer was to request any person found in 
possession of live game birds to show his authority. The 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat granted Appellant's Motion to Strike 
Gurley's false Affidavit, holding that "it is clear that the 
Gurley document is riddled with untruths." Judge Moffat's minute 
entry (R. 0216) and his formal order (R. 0235-0237) were both 
filed with POST, in support of the Complaint, and copies are 
attached hereto. 
Gurley made other false statements, under oath, in an effort 
to conceal that he destroyed crucial evidence in disregard of his 
obligations as a law enforcement officer.-' No argument is made 
herein about the numerous other "untruths" found by Judge Moffat, 
for the matter of the citation, being based on uncontrovertible 
documentary evidence, adequately establishes the perjury. 
"* Gurley'* statement to POST at R. 0244-0247 reveals additional false statements in the 
Affidavit, details of vhich are explained at footnote 5 on p. 24. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Peace Officer Training Code and regulations thereunder, 
together with the Administrative Procedures Act which it 
implements and adopts, provide for five levels or stages for 
processing any question of peace officer misconduct: (1) 
allegation of misconduct, (2) investigation, (3) formulation of 
the claim or charge, (4) adjudication and (5) appeal. 
At the first stage, the allegation of "grounds for refusal, 
suspension or revocation of certification" may be informal, from 
"any responsible source" under Utah Administrative Code 
§ R728-409-3, or by formal charge of misconduct by citizen 
complaint under Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-5. 
At the second stage, the allegation of grounds is investigated 
by a "staff member" under Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-5E. 
It is important to observe that the investigation is the only 
function assigned to staff, and that staff is limited to "makfinal 
a recommendation to proceed or discontinue action in the matter." 
Id. Any decision, including any decision to discontinue action, 
must be made by the "presiding officer" or the Council on Peace 
Officer Standards and Training ("Council" herein). 
The third stage, the charge, occurs in one of two ways, 
depending on how the proceeding was initiated. 
(a) If the proceeding originated by a staff investigation, a 
notice of agency action is issued on "reasonable belief that cause 
exists for the refusal, suspension or revokation of peace officer 
. . . certification." Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-5A. A 
notice of agency action and administrative complaint is issued in 
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that event under Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-8 and Utah 
Code Ann. § 6 3 - 4 6 b - 3 ( 2 ) M 
(b) I f the ac t ion i s i n i t i a t e d by a c i t i z e n complaint under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3) and Utah Administrative Code 
§ R728-409-5B6, there must be a statement served on the respondent 
o f f i c e r s e t t i n g out the f a c t s , l e g a l authority and other pert inent 
information and statement of the r e l i e f sought. In that event the 
pres id ing o f f i c e r must conduct a hearing on the merits of the 
C3) 
Complaint pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3 ltd) and take 
evidence, or may dismiss the complaint i f i t f a i l s t o s t a t e a 
claim or grant a summary judgment under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 6 3 - 4 6 b - l ( 4 ) . Only the "presiding" o f f i c e r may conduct the 
hearing, or dismiss the Complaint. Staf f has no authori ty to 
Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-3(2): 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the following 
requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding 
officer, and shall include: 
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice is being 
given by the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mailing address of 
any attorney or employee who has been designated to appear for the agency; 
(li) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted 
informally according to the provisions of rules adopted under Sections 
63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the provisions of Sections 
63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that each 
respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the mailing date of 
the notice of agency action; 
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is 
required by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any 
scheduled hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing is to be 
held, and a statement that a party who fails to attend or participate in the 
hearing may be held in default; 
(vlii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing is 
required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be 
requested by a party within the time prescribed by rule, a statement that the 
parties may request a hearing within the time provided by the agency's rules; 
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the 
adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained; 
(x) the name, title, nailing address, and telephone number of the presiding 
officeri and 
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and, to the 
extent known by the presiding officer, the questions to be decided. 
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dismiss a complaint or grant summary judgment. 
The fourth stage, the trial, was never reached in this case 
and this appeal represents the fifth stage, the appeal. 
The Order was in error and must be reversed because it was not 
by a presiding officer and fails to conform to the requirements of 
Rules 12(b) and 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and ignores the 
uncontroverted evidence attached to the Complaint. The Order 
further errs in not securing due process, including the right to a 
hearing and to cross-examine witnesses, and disregards the orders 
of Judges Young and Moffat, which have collateral estoppel 
effect. This Court should, therefore, enter appropriate relief 
including directing the entry of findings confirming the 
uncontroverted facts adduced by Petitioner and, in particular, 
directing reference of Gurley to appropriate prosecutorial 
authorities. 
A R G U M E N T 
The Legislature adopted a new Administrative Procedures Act in 
1988 (the "Act" herein), and amended it in 1990, and again in 
1991, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et seq, leaving no room for 
doubt that it applies to every proceeding before an agency. If 
there could be such doubt, the statute creating POST, Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-15-2.2 (quoted supra.) specifically declares that POST 
"shall comply with the procedures and requirements of [the 
Administrative Procedures Act]." The Act also makes clear that 
there must be due process and fairness at each of five levels of 
proceedings, corresponding to proceedings in the judicial 
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process: (1) allegation of misconduct, (2) investigation, (3) 
formulation of the claim or charge, (4) adjudication and (5) 
appeal. The Administrative Code thus defines the "anatomy of an 
administrative proceeding" corresponding to the anatomy of a civil 
or criminal judicial proceeding. There must be a hearing, if a 
hearing is demanded, either on the merits or on an order of 
dismissal or for summary judgment. There is no provision for 
termination of a bona fide citizen complaint without affording the 
right to a hearing. 
The Order herein was plainly a "Final Order." It disposed of 
Petitioner's Complaint and left nothing for further decision. 
Cf., Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah App. 1989). 
Accord, Barney v. Department of Commerce, 183 Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah 
App., Mar. 26, 1992). 
The fundamental error of POST is that it ignored the 
legislatures' plain direction that administrative proceedings 
comport with due process including the right to a hearing. POST 
treated the Complaint of Petitioner as it might have done in an 
earlier era, when peace officer misconduct was like any other 
master-servant relationship, to be dealt with administratively 
with unfettered and sometimes arbitrary discretion. 
POINT I 
THE ACT MANDATES 
DUE PROCESS IN AGENCY PROCEEDINGS 
The overriding purpose of the Act was to establish due process 
and fairness in all agency proceedings. 
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A. Staff May Not Refuse, at the First Level of Proceedings, to 
Entertain a Citizen Complaint. 
It must be observed, as a first proposition, that both the 
Administrative Procedures Act and Utah Administrative Code 
§ R728-409-5A give members of the public, who a peace officer must 
serve, substantive rights in the disciplinary process. To that 
end, § R728-409-5A provides that, at the first stage of an 
administrative proceeding, the action may be initiated in one of 
two ways. Either (1) "[a]11 investigations initiated by the 
division of an individual . . . shall be commenced upon the 
reasonable belief that cause exists for the refusal, suspension or 
revocation of peace officer . . . certification" or (2) the 
proceeding will be initiated by a citizen complaint. Petitioner's 
Complaint was pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6, part B, Utah 
Administrative Code § R728-409-5 which specifically permit a 
citizen to file a "complaint . . . which, on its face, appears to 
[state] a violation of section 409-3." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a) provides that "[w]here the law 
applicable to the agency permits persons other than the agency to 
initiate adjudicative proceedings" they may do so in writing. 
Said § 63-46b-3(3)* further declares that, if the agency's rules 
permit initiation of a complaint, a "presiding officer" shall 
review the complaint and either proceed to hearing or notify the 
complainant that the request is denied. 
The presiding officer shall promptly review a 
request for agency action and shall: 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing 
that the request is granted and that the 
adjudicative proceeding is completed; 
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(ii) notify the requesting party in writing 
that the request is denied and, if the 
proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, 
that the party may request a hearing before the 
agency to challenge the denial; or 
(iii) notify the requesting party that 
further proceedings are required to determine 
the agency's response to the request. 
Even a denial of the request is subject to a right to a hearing 
under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-3v(d) , discussed infra at p. 20-21. 
There is, in a word, a right to a hearing in all events, even if 
the complaint is dismissed. There is no requirement of a hearing 
by a presiding officer on every informal complaint received by 
POST, whether verbal or in writing, but when a citizen initiates a 
formal complaint, by conforming to the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a), staff has no discretion not to proceed. 
Agency rules afford the right to complain, but the statute defines 
the elements of a formal complaint and the procedure to be 
followed. 
B. Staff Discretion at the Second Level Is Limited to 
Investigation. 
The second level of the administrative proceeding, the inves-
tigation, does not result from any provision of the Administrative 
Procedures Act proper, but from the provisions of Utah 
Administrative Code § R728-409-5E that "[a] staff member will be 
assigned to investigate the complaint or information and to make a 
recommendation to proceed or discontinue action in the matter." 
(Emphasis added.) 
1. POST Staff May Only "Investigate. Neither the statute nor 
the Administrative Procedures Act affords POST discretion, and 
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surely not arbitrary discretion, not to proceed. The 
"recommendation" at the second, or investigative, level is only 
that — a suggestion to the "presiding officer," much like a peace 
officer or investigator would make to a prosecutor or judge. That 
result follows, of necessity, from the following language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4): 
(4) This chapter does not preclude . . . the 
presiding officer during an adjudicative 
proceeding from: 
* * * 
(b) granting a timely motion to dis-
miss or for summary judgment if the 
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, 
respectively, of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are met by the moving party, 
except to the extent that the require-
ments of those rules are modified by this 
chapter. (Emphasis added.) 
Said Section R728-409-5E of the rules is entitled "investigative 
procedure" and states that an investigation shall be made upon 
"reasonable belief" that cause exists for discipline. 
The positive error of the Order herein is evident if it is 
observed that the only discretion afforded under the 
Administrative Procedures Act was necessarily exercised by 
determining that the Complaint did, in fact, state a cause of 
action. That must be so, for the Order reveals that POST did in 
fact investigate. The Order states that the order "is based on a 
thorough examination of all the records and documents provided by 
yourself, Dale Gurley, and the Attorney General's Office" and that 
"in addition to the written information, interviews were conducted 
with yourself, Mr. Gurley, the Tooele County Attorney, and the 
Attorney General's Office." The Order thus confirms that the 
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"reasonable belief" standard was met. "Probable cause" was 
necessarily resolved against Gurley. 
2. Only a "Presiding Officer" May Dismiss a Complaint. POST 
was thus obligated to proceed to the charging phase, or third 
level of proceedings specified at subdivision (d) of Section 3V. 
The respondent officer must be required to answer and a "presiding 
officer" (usually an administrative law judge) appointed to decide 
if the complaint and answer present a claim. 
A staff member may conduct an investigation, but only a 
"presiding officer" may decide not to proceed and if he does so he 
must afford the complainant with reasons for the decision, a right 
to a hearing and a right of appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-46b-3(3)(d) and 63-46b-5(1)(i). It would be a strange 
twist, indeed, if POST could avoid those plain provisions by 
simply refusing to assign a file number to a formal complaint and 
refusing to require the Respondent to so much as answer. Due 
process, which is required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8, supra., 
would admit of no such ruse. 
The "presiding officer" may be the Director or a person or 
group of persons so designated by the Director. Thus Mr. Orr may 
have appointed himself the presiding officer, or he may designate 
himself and Mr. Morris, the Bureau Chief, to act jointly as the 
presiding officer. In this matter POST has conceded in its motion 
to dismiss this appeal that Mr. Orr did not act as a presiding 
officer, and that "POST conducted a preliminary investigation . . . 
and declined to initiate formal proceedings." Mem. in Support of 
Motion for Summary Disposition p. 3. POST also concedes that it 
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"mailed a letter to Petitioner, indicating the decision to take no 
action . . ." Id. (Emphasis added.) It is important to 
recognize, however, that even if Mr. Orr had acted as "presiding 
officer" he would have initiated a "formal adjudicative 
proceeding" and would have thus proceeded to the third stage of 
proceedings. Thereafter the Administrative Procedures Act 
controls the conduct of proceedings. 
The first error of the Order is that there is no authority to 
dispose of a bona fide complaint at the second or investigative 
level. Even if the Order could be considered at the third, or 
charging level, it was nevertheless in error because it fails to 
meet the standards of Rule 12(b) or 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (See Point C , infra.) 
3. The Order Herein Exceeded POST/s Discretion. The Order 
cannot be by a "presiding officer" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-3Y(d) (11) (quoted supra) , even if it be conceded that Mr. 
Orr might have designated himself and/or Mr. Morris to act in that 
capacity, for it did not afford Petitioner the right to request a 
hearing nor did it include the elements of a notice by a presiding 
officer defined at Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(i) fviz., it did 
not state reasons, or findings, and did not include a right of 
administrative or judicial review]. The Order was, necessarily, a 
"formal adjudicative proceeding" for the purpose of said 
§ 3^)(ii), for there is no provision in the Peace Office 
Standards and Training Code, Utah Administrative Code § R728-409, 
for informal adjudicative proceedings and Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 63-46b-4(2) provides that ". . . all agency adjudicative 
proceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by 
the agency's rules shall be conducted formally in accordance with 
the requirements of this chapter.1' 
Petitioner called this dilemma to POST'S attention with a 
timely motion for rehearing. POST was requested to declare, in 
particular, if the order was a staff decision pursuant to said 
code § R728-409-5 or a decision by Director Orr acting as 
. . . <£> .. 
"presiding officer" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)(11). 
POST was also requested to enter the findings required by the 
Act. Although POST declined to provide this Court with guidance 
by defining what the basis for the Order was, we submit that a 
careful reading of the Act leads to the inescapable conclusion 
that the Order must be at the second, or investigative level. It 
must be at the investigative stage, for Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-3f(d) requires a review and a notice by a "presiding 
officer," but no presiding officer was ever appointed herein. It 
is therefore in error, for no decision making authority exists at 
the investigative stage. 
this Court is guided by the principle that 
where a "'specific power is conferred by 
statute upon a tribunal, board, or commission 
with limited powers, the powers are limited to 
such as are specifically mentioned.'" Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 103 Utah 
186, 197, 134 P.2d 469, 474 (1943) (quoting 
Bamberger Elec. R.R. Co. v. Public Utilities 
Comm'n, 59 Utah 351, 364, 204 P. 314, 320 
(1922)). All powers retained [by an 
administrative agency] are derived from and 
created by statute. The [administrative 
agency] has no inherent regulatory powers and 
can only assert those which are expressly 
granted or clearly implied as necessary to the 
21 
discharge of the duties and responsibilities 
imposed upon it. Basin Flying Serv. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 
1975). To ensure that the administrative 
powers . . • are not overextended, "any 
reasonable doubt of the existence of anv power 
must be resolved against the exercise 
thereof." Public Serv. Comm'n v. Formal 
Complaint of VfWZ Co., 641 P.2d 183, 186 (Wyo. 
1982). Williams v. Public Service 
Commission, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The only staff discretion afforded by the administrative code 
is to make a recommendation to the presiding officer, or Council, 
about whether the Complaint states a cause of action. There is no 
discretion for staff to decide the merits of a complaint. 
C. Any Decision Must Be by a "Presiding Officer" — at the 
Third Level. 
Considering the order as a dismissal of the Complaint, on its 
merits, as we must, it is clear that such an order must be at the 
third, or charging level, and must satisfy the requirements for 
such an order. It is clear, therefore, that POST may not deny a 
hearing. POST must appoint a "presiding officer," and the 
presiding officer must either deny the request and afford the 
Complainant a hearing on the denial, Q£ notify Gurley to answer 
and afford the Complainant a hearing on the allegations of the 
Complaint. In either event, a hearing must be afforded. That 
Cf 
result is clear from a plain reading of Utah Code Ann. § 63-4 6b-3Y 
subdivison (d), but if there could be any doubt it is removed by 
the provision of subdivision (e) that *[a]ny notice required by 
Subsection (3)(d)(ii) shall contain the information required by 
Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by 
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Subsection (3)(d)(ii) of this section." Thus any denial of a 
request for adjudicative proceedings must be by a notice from the 
"presiding officer" advising the "requesting party" that he or she 
"may request a hearing before the agency to challenge the denial/7 
and by 
. . . a signed order in writing that states the 
following: 
(i) the decision; 
(ii) the reasons for the decision; 
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative 
or judicial review available to the parties; and 
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or 
requesting a review. 
Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-7 makes clear that the 
purpose of the staff investigation is to make recommendations to 
the presiding officer or the Council on Peace Officer Standards 
and Training, and that only the presiding officer or the Council 
can act on the merits of a complaint. 
POINT II 
STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
WERE NOT MET 
POST held no hearing and took no evidence, and, moreover, 
ignored the documentary evidence attached to the Complaint. The 
Order must, therefore, have been a determination that the 
Complaint failed to state a cause of action. Such an order may be 
entered by a presiding officer under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-l(4)(b), provided the requirements of Rule 12(b) or 56, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are met. 
A. The Order Does Not Satisfy Standards for Dismissal. 
The basis for the Order, if considered in light of the 
23 
requirements of Rule 12(b) , i s d i f f i c u l t t o grasp. I t could not 
be that the Complaint f a i l e d t o a l l e g e the s i x (6) elements 
s p e c i f i e d a t Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a) (quoted supra, pp. 
3 - 4 ) . To the contrary, examination of the Complaint (R. 
0054-0059) w i l l reveal that each and every element was a l l e g e d , 
s er ia t im, and in d e t a i l . Examination of the Complaint w i l l a l s o 
reveal that i t incorporated c e r t i f i e d evidence supporting i t s 
a l l e g a t i o n s , including the f a l s e Af f idav i t of Gurley (R. 0088), 
the C e r t i f i c a t e of the Court that no c i t a t i o n was i ssued (R. 
0106), Gurley's answers t o discovery requests e s t a b l i s h i n g h i s own 
admission, under oath, that the Af f idav i t was f a l s e (R. 0177-0178) 
and Judge Young's Order determining that Gurley did not act 
properly. (R. 0103.) Judge Moffat's Order determining that the 
Gurley Af f idav i t was perjury —' was a l s o f i l e d with POST. (R. 
0216, 0235.) 
POST'S investigative notes further establish that Gurley's Affidavit was perjury. The 
extent to which Gurley's every utterance is infected with untruths and Gurley's willingness to 
swear to anything if it suits hLs immediate purposes, is indicated by the following: 
Gurley's Affidavit states that he "issued" a citation to Parker Nielson on September 13, 
1990, "by mailing it to him," and that a copy of the citation was attached. The copy was signed 
by Gurley, stating that "I certLfy that a copy of this citation . . . was served on the 
Defendant according to law," but Gurley told POST at R. 0244 that he "had no original intent to 
issue a citation to Parker Nielson" and that the phony citation "was not going to be sent." 
Gurley denied at R. 0071 that he made any statement to Darrel Holden, but at R. 0246 he 
admits that he had a conversation vith Holden on 9/13 by phone. The deposition of Leavitt at R. 
0148-0149 also indicates that Gurley talked to Holden, contrary to his denial in his Affidavit. 
Gurley denied at R. 0070 making any statement to Deputy Sheriff Dan Taylor (see Taylor's 
Affidavit that Gurley threatened to arrest Plaintiff), or that he stated he would cause 
Plaintiff to be arrested (R. 0065) and at % 17 of his Affidavit (R. 0092) Gurley denied saying 
that he would cause Plaintiff to be cited, but admitted to POST at R. 0245 that he recalls the 
conversation with Taylor and that he stated "that if he caught Parker Nielson violating the lav 
he would in fact cite him." It is a coincidence, to be sure, that Gurley would single out 
Parker Nielson for such a statement, six years before the event. 
Gurley denied in his Affidavit (p. 4) that he released the bird, but stated to POST at 
R. 0246 that in "reality the plan was to catch it, look at it and release." (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Morris apparently feels that a person should be sanguine about Gurley falsely stating 
that he had been charged with a crime. Objecting to such false charges "revealed a vindictive 
and prejudice [sic] perspective." Morris thus promoted Gurley to victim and "regrets the 
personal trauma you have experienced as a result of trying to carry out your 
responsibilities"--reminiscent of Chief Gates' defense of his white police officers in a well 
publicized incident tried in Siml, California. 
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The law is familiar that dismissal for failure to state a 
claim under Rule 12(b) requires that all allegations of the 
Complaint be taken as true. An appellate court "must accept the 
factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff." Prows v. State, 175 Adv. Rep. 6, 7 
(Utah 1991), c i t ing St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). See also, Coleman v. Utah 
State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Lowe v. 
Sorenson Research Co., 119 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
Thus, stating the facts in a light most favorable to 
Petitioner, as this Court must, State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
117 (Utah 1989), it must be accepted that Gurley conducted an 
illegal search and seizure.-^ It must also be accepted as true 
that Gurley made no arrest, obtained no warrant and issued no 
citation in connection with the search and seizure. It must then 
be accepted as the fact that Gurley made no report of his activity 
until after he was sued civilly, and that he then backdated an 
investigative report to create a false appearance that his conduct 
° This Court has recently held In State v. Smith. 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (May 22, 1992), 
that, even under the "automobile exception," there must be "probable cause to believe the car 
contains evidence the officer is entitled to seiee," citing Chambers v. Maronev. 399 U.S. 42, 
48, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1979 (1970), but noting at n.4 that "the Utah Supreme Court, interpreting the 
Utah Constitution, has propounded a considerably more narrow view of the automobile exception. 
See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 465-71 (Utah 1990)." Even under the "traditional" 
application of the automobile exception, this Court held that the following conditions must be 
present to avoid the requirement of obtaining a warrant: 
The truck was traveling on a public road and clearly was "readily 
movable." Moreover, the vehicle contained weapons and ammunition which 
Wyunn and Smith might have accessed, Helms was the only law enforcement 
officer on the scent, and these events all took place in a remote area of 
Utah. 
No such conditions were present, on the agreed facts herein, to justify the seizure by Gurley 
without a warrant. Be has so stated, under oath. 
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was pursuant to peace officer authority. It must also be accepted 
as true that Gurley refused to account for the property he had 
seized as he was required to do under Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2. 
Finally, and most telling, it must be accepted as the fact, as 
Gurley's own sworn statements confirm (R. 0177-0178) and POST'S 
investigative notes clearly establish, that he prepared a false or 
simulated citation purporting to charge Petitioner with crimes 
which never occurred and which were never charged, filed it with 
the Third Judicial District Court for Tooele County, Utah, 
attached to an affidavit falsely stating, under oath, that Gurley 
"issued" the citation on or about September 13, 1990, by mailing 
it to Petitioner, and that the false citation and Affidavit were 
for the purpose of influencing judicial proceedings before the 
Honorable David S. Young, District Judge and that the reason 
Gurley did all those things was that he had animosity towards 
Plaintiff and all dog trainers. (Judge Young so ruled at R. 0101.) 
Only if the those facts, and all reasonable inference to be 
drawn from them, present no reasonable grounds for discipline of a 
peace officer can the Order be affirmed. 
B. The Order May Not be Affirmed Under Summary Judgment Standards. 
If the Order was under provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-l(4) permitting the "presiding officer" to grant a motion 
for summary judgment, on the other hand, the requirements are 
substantially the same. That section incorporates Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires at (d) thereof that there 
be 
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an order specifiying the facts that appear 
without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. 
There were no such findings and could not be in face of the 
uncontroverted evidence attached to the Complaint. Petitioner in 
fact proposed findings, based entirely upon certified and 
uncontroverted documents. Petitioner's proposed finding should 
now be entered by this Court. 
The clear, unmistakeable basis for the Order, rather, is that 
POST simply rejected the evidence presented and adopted its own 
findings to the contrary — without evidence, without hearing and 
without due process. The Order was clearly a summary judgment 
proceeding, therefore, entered sua sponte. which must find its 
basis or authority in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4) (quoted supra). 
POINT III 
DUE PROCESS WAS DENIED 
Reduced to simple terms, the effect of the foregoing 
provisions is to declare that the agency may not act arbitrarily. 
The presiding officer may enter an order of dismissal for failure 
to state a claim, or for summary judgment if there is no genuine 
dispute as to the material facts, but in either event there must 
be a hearing and findings adequate for review on appeal — either 
as prescribed by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or, on 
dismissal, the minimum findings necessary to an informal 
adjudicative proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 obligates POST 
to secure due process and basic fairness: 
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(a) The presiding officer shall regulate 
the course of the hearing to obtain full 
disclosure of relevant facts and to afford 
all the parties reasonable opportunity to 
present their positions. 
The Supreme Court has held that "care should be taken that 
[administrative] procedures should comport with standards of 
fairness and due process." Club Stanyon Street v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, 615 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1980). 
Without essaying disrespect for Messrs. Orr and Morris, we 
submit that these proceedings afford a study in how judicial 
officers and law enforcement officers often view the same facts 
differently, and why due process requires decisions by the former 
(viz., by a "presiding officer") to the exclusion of the latter. 
Judges Young and Moffat saw Gurley's search and seizure without a 
warrant as without probable cause and in disregard of the 
statutory requirement of a request to show authority (R. 0103) and 
his filing an affidavit stating otherwise to be "riddled with 
untruths." (R. 0216, 0235.) Messrs. Morris and Orr, whose 
background is police work, congratulated Gurley on the same facts 
for his "dealings with citizens of this state [which] are 
reflective of the confidence placed in you" and found his 
"acknowledge[d] mistakes" as "nothing less than professional and 
procedural in all respects." (R. 0250.) Those differences in 
point of view, we submit, account for the Legislature's 
requirement that the merits be decided by an administrative law 
judge and limitation of staff to making a recommendation like a 
policeman would to a regular judge. No effort was made by Messrs. 
Orr and Morris to conform to due process. They afforded 
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Petitioner no hearing. They adopted Gurley's version of the 
facts, knowing that he was an adjudicated perjurer and disregarded 
certified evidence to the contrary. They did not even identify if 
their order was pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3*(d) , Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) or Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l (1). They 
declined, even when request to do so was made by Petitionees 
request for reconsideration and by demand for entry of findings 
adopting the uncontroverted facts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) provides that on appeal from 
final agency action in formal adjudicative proceedings this Court 
"shall grant relief" if "the agency has acted beyond the 
jurisdiction conferred by any statute" or "has engaged in an 
unlawful procedure or decision making process, or has failed to 
follow prescribed procedure." This Court has given literal effect 
to those provisions, holding that it is necessary for an 
administrative agency to afford "due process of law, including the 
opportunity for a fair hearing." E.g., D.B. v. Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145, 1148 
(Utah App. 1989). United States District Judge David K. Winder so 
concluded and found due process violated by proceedings against 
two dentists which did not strictly conform with the procedures 
prescribed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Hansen v. 
Robinson, Docket No. C-89-0749W (U.S.D.C, D. Utah, decided 
1989). This Court should grant the relief provided by Utah Code 
Ann. § 63~46b-16(4) by directing the adoption of Petitionees 
proposed findings reciting the uncontroverted facts. 
POST may not simply "duck its head," speaking figuratively, 
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and ignore a bona fide complaint. The clear purpose of the 
Administrative Procedures Act, its due process provisions in 
particular, is to require that such a complaint be decided on the 
merits. 
It is appropriate, at a time when this Court is at the 
threshold of development of standards under Utah's new 
Administrative Procedures Act, adopted in 1988, to recall the 
admonition of Mr. Justice Black when the modern Rules of Civil 
Procedure were at a similar stage of development. Mr. Justice 
Black, writing for a unanimous Court in Surowitz v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966), construed the very 
provisions of Rule 12(b) at issue herein and said: 
We cannot construe Rule 23 or any other one of 
the Federal Rules as compelling courts to 
summarily dismiss, without any answer or 
argument at all, cases like this where grave 
charges of fraud are shown by the record to be 
based on reasonable beliefs growing out of 
careful investigation. The basic purpose of the 
Federal Rules is to administer justice through 
fair trials, not through summary dismissals as 
necessary as they may be on occasion . . . . If 
rules of procedure work as they should in an 
honest and fair judicial system they not only 
permit, but should as nearly as possible 
guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried 
to an adjudication on the merits. 
It is a familiar proposition that due process requires a right 
to be heard before a tribunal competent by its constitution — 
that is, by the law of its creation — to pass upon the subject 
matter. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 719, 733 (1878); accord, 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316-17 (Utah 1945). Utah 
(p 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-8^ (d) secures that right in administrative 
proceedings: 
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The presiding officer shall afford all parties 
the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
In that regard, this Court plainly declared, in D.B. v. 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, supra. at 
1147 (Utah App. 1989) that 
an opportunity to challenge the truthfulness of 
testimony . . . "is even more important where the 
evidence consists of the testimony of individuals 
whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, 
might be perjurers or persons motivated by 
malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice or 
jealousy. We have formalized these protections 
in the requirements of confrontation and 
cross-examination. They have ancient roots." 
[quoting from Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 
(1959).] 
POINT IV 
THE ORDER DISREGARDS DOCTRINES OF REPOSE 
It is particularly egregious, we submit, that Director Orr and 
his Certification Bureau Chief swept aside adjudications by Judges 
Young and Moffat that Gurley acted without probable cause, with 
malice, and swore untruthfully. Messrs. Orr and Morris declared 
that they had taken "evidence,* from which thev concluded that 
Gurley acted with probable cause and that though he made some 
"errors," his affidavit was not "riddled with untruths." Findings 
of Morris at R. 0249 thus document that he presumed to overrule 
the findings of Judges Young and Moffat. 
It is clear, in context, that Messrs. Orr and Morris simply 
interviewed Gurley, and his counsel, accepted their explanation 
and rejected the adjudications of Judges Young and Moffat. What 
was it that the Attorney General (a co-defendant with Gurley in 
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related proceedings before the United States District Court) said 
to Messrs. Orr and Morris that led them to those conclusions? 
What was the testimony of Gurley that led them to the conclusion 
that what Judge Moffat considered perjury was merely "common 
errors that substantiate the fact that we are all human beings 
subject to clerical debilities"? The very purpose of the 
requirement of the Administrative Procedures Act that there be a 
hearing, and findings, is to require a record from which this 
Court can decide if such testimony was adequate — or if any 
testimony was given. 
Director Orr's acknowledgement that "when [Gurley] seized and 
dismantled your pen . . . his reports reflect some errors" does 
not adequately state the case — or even come close! Stating that 
"I issued a citation," when there was none, cannot be dismissed as 
a mere "error." To state that "a copy of [the citation] is 
attached," when it is the "Defendent's [sic] copy" (see lower left 
hand corner of the phony citation) — a copy, it must be observed, 
which was not and could not have been "served" — is a blunder of 
such enormity that it removes any possibility that the statement 
was advanced in good faith or with the care which should attend 
either a statement under oath or a solemn act like charging one 
with a crime, or that Messrs. Orr and Morris approached the matter 
with a resolve to determine the truth. 
"Some errors" does not even begin to address the problem. 
Judges Young and Moffat held that Gurley acted "without probable 
cause" and that his sworn statement was "riddled with untruths." 
Director Orr rejected those findings out of hand and without 
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taking evidence or making any findings supporting his conclusion. 
We have never understood, at least until now, that the Police 
Academy has appellate jurisdiction to reverse the District Court. 
The Order thus disregards the doctrine collateral estoppel, 
which is stated at ALI, RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS,SECOND § 29. The 
Utah Court has applied the Restatement doctrine in HiJI v. 
Seattle First National Bank, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Feb. 24, 
1992) : 
Collateral estoppel, or more precisely, issue 
preclusion, prevents relitigation of issues 
already determined in a previous action. See 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 
1988). Collateral estoppel applies if four 
requirements are met: 
First, the issue in both cases must be 
identical. Second, the judgment must be 
final with respect to that issue. Third, 
the issue must have been fully, fairly, and 
competently litigated in the first action. 
Fourth, the party who is precluded from 
litigating the issue must be either a party 
to the first action or a privy of a party. 
As the Restatement declares, at Comment b: 
A party who has had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate an issue has been accorded the 
elements of due process. In the absence of 
circumstances suggesting the appropriateness of 
allowing him to relitigate the issue, there is 
no good reason for refusing to treat the issue 
as settled so far as he is concerned other than 
that of making the burden of litigation risk and 
expense symmetrical between him and his 
adversaries. 
The Reporter's Note to the Restatement declares that the 
"abrogation [of the mutuality rule] projected in Bernhard v. Bank 
of America Nafl Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 
(1942) has now gained general acceptance," citing Richards v. 
Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971). 
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POINT V 
THIS COURT SHOULD DIRECT APPROPRIATE RELIEF 
This Court can, and we submit should, order appropriate 
relief. Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-17 makes clear that in reviewing 
an administrative proceeding this Court is not limited to merely 
reviewing the record and provides: 
Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) . . . . (b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its 
discretion as required by law; 
(ii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(Emphasis added.) 
The evidence of Gurley's false Affidavit is uncontroverted, 
and in fact admitted by him in his statement to POST. The matter 
of Gurley's conduct being unlawful and without probable cause, and 
the lawfulness of Petitionees conduct, are reduced to judgment by 
Judge Young. The perjury of Gurley is adjudicated by Judge 
Moffat. The provisions of Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-5G 
are mandatory: 
If the alleged conduct constitutes a public 
offense for which the individual has not been 
previously convicted, the division shall 
immediately notify the appropriate prosecutorial 
authority. 
Petitioner submitted an appropriate request for entry of 
findings to that effect. They are uncontrovertible.-' This 
Petitioner's proposed findings were as follows: 
The following facts appear without substantial controversy herein. 
1. On September 12, 1990, civil suit was initiated against Dale Gurley by a Verified 
Complaint, a copy of which is attached to the Complaint herein as Exhibit "A", Partial Summary 
Judgment as to which was entered against Curley by the Honorable David S. Young on June 24, 
1991, a copy of which is attached to the Complaint herein as Exhibit "B*. 
2. Gurley prepared an investigative report dated September 8, 1990, a copy of which is 
attached to an affidavit in the civil proceedings attached to the Complaint herein as Exhibit 
" C . 
3. Gurley's affidavit in the civil proceedings, a copy of which is attached to the 
Complaint herein as Exhibit "C, states as follows: 
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Court should d i r e c t the entry of the requested f ind ings , or d i rec t 
POST t o do s o . 
The matter of perjury, already determined by the order of 
Footnote 7 continued 
I did not finalize my report on the bird trap until September 13, 1990, 
vhen I was served with a Summons in this lawsuit. Prior to that date I had 
made field notes of my investigation and made sketches of the bird trap. I 
finalised my report on September 13, 1990, because I learned, through the 
service of the Summons on me, that Plaintiff was the one who owned the bird 
trap." (Emphasis added.) 
4. Gurley attached a "citation" against Parker M. Nielson to the affidavit filed vith 
Judge Young stating, under oath, that "I issued a citation to Plaintiff [Parker M. Nielson] on 
or about September 13, 1990 by mailing it to him." 
5. No citation was mailed to Parker M. Nielson and Gurley had previously stated, under 
oath in Answers filed with the Court on on October 22, 1990, copies of which are attached to 
the Complaint herein as Exhibit "D" (see Response to Request No. 7) that he "made no arrest of 
Plaintiff, includlnR by Issuance of any citation for any alleged violation of law, on 
September 8, 1990, or at any time thereafter . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
6. The certificate of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Tooele County, attached to the 
Complaint herein as Exhibit "E", establishes that no such "citation" was ever filed with the 
Court. 
7. Gurley's affidavit quoted above confirms that he prepared the citation after service 
of summons on him. 
8. Gurley stated in his affidavit submitted to Judge Young that "I did not know that [the 
undersigned] owned the bird trap until after I was served with a Summons and Complaint," but 
Gurley's own investigative report attached to his affidavit (Exhibit "C" to the Complaint 
herein) states that five days earlier, on September 8, 1990 he had a conversation with Mr. 
Charlie Larsen, a rancher, in which "I then said, 'Does it belong to Parker Nielson?' and he 
said,'Yes, he thinks so.'" 
9. Both his investigative report and his "citation" indicate that the "chukar in the trap 
was released back to the wild," but Gurley stated in his affidavit (Exhibit "C" to the 
Complaint herein) that "I did not release the one wild game bird that I found in the trap. I 
attempted to catch it but it got out of the pen and flew away before I could do so." 
10. Gurley's report acknowledges that "two net wire and chicken wire tubes were removed 
. . . to shut down the trap" (Report attached to Exhibit "C" to the Complaint hereto, emphasis 
added) and Gurley has acknowledged that "he dismantled [the recall pen) to render it 
inoperative." (Exhibit "D" to the Complaint herein, answer to Request No. 6, emphasis added.) 
11. Judge Young has concluded that Gurley's conduct "was with malice towards dog trainers 
as a group or [Petitioner] in particular.'* (See Exhibit "B" to the Complaint herein at %0. ) 
12. Judge Young has determined that Utah Administrative Code S R608-4-3, providing that: 
Any peace officer or special function officer may request persons engaged 
in activities covered under these rules to exhibit any documentation 
related to such activities (including, but not limited to, certificate of 
registration, permit, health certificate, bill of sale, proof of 
ownership), any game birds, and any device, apparatus and facility used for 
activities covered under these rules. 
defines the proper procedure and that "[t]he conduct of [Gurley] was therefore without 
probable cause or authority . . . ." (See Exhibit "B" to the Complaint at %5.) 
13. Judge Young has ruled that "[p]eace officers, including Conservation Officers such as 
[Gurley], are prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. f 23-20-15 from breaking into an 
enclosure such as that owned by [Parker M. Nielson]." (See Exhibit "B" to the Complaint 
herein at %5.) 
14. Judge Young has ruled that Gurley's conduct was "without probable cause or authority 
under provisions of Utah Code Ann. $ 23-20-1 that Conservation Officers 'shall follow the same 
procedure in . . . enforcement of this code, as other peace officers.'" (See Exhibit "B" to 
the Complaint herein at %5.) 
15. Judge Moffat has ruled, in his Order dated January 31, 1992, attached to the motion 
herein dated May 13, 1992, that the Affidavit of Dale Gurley dated April 18, 1991, is riddled 
with untruths. 
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Judge Moffat, is uniquely the province and concern of the courts. 
There is no need, nor is it appropriate, to remand that matter to 
the agency. This Court should refer Gurley to the appropriate 
prosecutorial authority, remanding to the agency consideration of 
what sanctions or limitations on peace officer certification are 
necessary or appropriate pending Gurley's prosecution. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
There is a school of thought, we are told, that lawyers should 
not descend into controversies such as this one. There is another 
school of thought, however, that lawyers are indebted to the 
system, to make it work and correct abuses when they are found. 
We, frankly, are committed to the latter point of view. Only 
lawyers have the skills and resources to correct peace officer 
abuses such as Gurley committed in this case. 
Utah State Bar Commissioner Jan Graham, Solicitor for the Utah 
Attorney General's Office, stated that "a big part of my job is 
defending the actions of police officers," and then had some 
appropriate comments about peace officer abuses in an article 
entitled What They Don't Know, UTAH BAR JOURNAL Vol. 5 No. 6 
at p. 8 (June-July, 1992). "Utah law enforcement has worked hard 
in recent years to modify practices that fuel the negative 
stereotypes of abuse of police power," Ms. Graham declared, but 
"right thinking leadership in law enforcement has gotten the 
message and is leading the way to a more accessible, human image 
for police officers" Ms. Graham continued, but "then came the 
Rodney King videotape" and "all the destructive stereotypes about 
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law enforcement were back on the table, unraveling years of 
progress in Utah." 
We can certainly agree that the creation of POST and the 
enactment of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1988, as amended 
in 1991# are efforts to remove "abuse of police power." There is 
no need to look as far away as California and the Rodney King 
abuses to find threats which threaten to unravel "years of 
progress in Utah," however, for surely it does not require beating 
with a baton to constitute a peace officer abuse, and the sworn 
admissions of Gurley herein are more vivid and convincing, even if 
not as dramatic, than the videotape in the Rodney King case. 
Failure to discipline peace officers such as Gurley, who clearly 
have abused their police power and, even worse, filed false 
statements under oath to conceal their abuses threaten, far more, 
the "progress [that] has been made in that all-important area: 
public relations" that Ms. Graham wrote of. 
This Court should therefore direct appropriate action under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 and Utah Administrative Code 
§ R728-409-5G, including entry of Petitioner's proposed findings, 
or direction that POST do so, and reference of Gurley to the 
appropriate prosecutorial authority. 
Respectfully submitted this day of October, 1992. 
*^t * 
arker M. Nielson, Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT were hand delivered this ^ Z day of 
October# 1992 to: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Richard D. Wyss 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(0566/630/028) 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NIELSON, PARKER M 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
GURLEY, DALF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 900300302 PD 
DATE 12/23/91 
HONORABLE MOFFAT, RICHARD H. 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK RGB 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. NIELSON, PARKER (PRO SE) 
D. ATTY. SOLTIS, JOHN P 
THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF DALE GOURLEY AND DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION THERETO AND PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM, HEREBY 
MAKES ITS' MINUTE ENTRY: 
THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF DALE GOURLEY 
DOES NOT COMPLY WITH RULE SEVEN AND ELEVEN AND IN RELIANCE 
THEREON BASES ITS DECISON ON THE ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN THE 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND IN PARTICULAR THE ARGUMENT SET FORTH 
IN REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SAID MOTION. 
IT IS CLEAR, AS POINTED OUT IN SAID DOCUMENTS, THAT THE GOURLEY 
DOCUMENT IS RIDDLED WITH UNTRUTHS. SAID DOCUMENT, THEREFORE, 
WILL BE STRICKEN AND SANCTIONS WILL BE AWARDED AGAINST DEFENDANT 
GOURLEY IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE FAIR AND REASONABLE VALUE OF 
PLAINTIFFS PROFESSIONAL TIME IN SEARCHING THE RECORDS OF THE 
THIRD AND SIXTH CIRCUIT COURTS, WRITING CORRESPONDENCE TO 
COUNSEL REQUESTING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND I«-*FlLINCh.AND 
BRIEFING THE MOTION GRANTED HEREIN. 
PLAINTIFF WILL PREPARE AN APPROPRIATE ORDER, 
BY 
*=-.4 
C/C COUNSEL J ft 
#>'!> 
f i ' 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE GURLEY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER STRIKING AFFIDAVIT | OF DALE GURLEY AND 
i FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
i Civil No. 900 300 302 
I Judge Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley or 
Require Compliance with Rules 7 and 11 having been submitted for 
decision pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501(1)(d), Rules of 
Judicial Administration, and the Court having considered 
Plaintiffs motion and the documents attached thereto, Plaintiff's 
memorandum in support thereof, Defendant's memorandum in 
opposition dated November 25, 1991, together with the attachments 
thereto, and Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Strike Gurley Affidavit dated December 2, 1991; and the Court 
having entered its Minute Entry dated December 23, 1991, finding 
(1) that the Affidavit of Dale Gurley dated April 18, 1990, does 
not comply with Rules 7 and 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
(2) that the Gurley Affidavit dated April 18, 1990, is riddled 
with untruths, and (3) the Court adopts the reasons stated by 
Plaintiff in his motion, and in particular as stated in 
Cor--, ^  
-e 
Plaintiff's reply memorandum including that Gurley either made a 
knowing misrepresentation or knowingly made a false statement that 
he knew the matters stated in the affidavit to be true, for the 
purpose of denying Plaintiff's rights in this litigation 
wrongfully and without just cause or excuse; and, 
The Court having further determined that Gurley is a "party" 
who signed said Affidavit in violation of the provisions of Rule 
11# Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that to the best of 
his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact, and, 
The Court having determined that sanctions will be awarded 
against Gurley, and 
The Court having considered the Affidavit of Parker M, Nielson 
concerning his professional time in searching the records of the 
Third Circuit Court in Tooele, Utah, and the Sixth Circuit Court 
in Nephi, Utah, writing correspondence to counsel for Gurley 
herein requesting voluntary compliance with requirements of Rule 
11 and in filing and briefing Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Dale Gurley or Require Compliance with Rules 7 and 
11, and having considered the Affidavit of Paul T. Moxley 
concerning the reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time, 
and having determined that the amount of $3,289.00 is equal to the 
fair and reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time in that 
regard, and 
Being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby 
- 2 -
ORDERED, 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley 
or Require Compliance with Rule 7 and 11 is granted. 
2. The Affidavit of Dale Gurley dated April 18, 1991, is 
hereby stricken, however and wherever it may appear in these 
proceedings, for the reasons that it was not signed or otherwise 
certified by at least one attorney of record, as required by Rules 
7 and 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and because it is clear 
that it is riddled with untruths. 
3. Sanctions are hereby awarded to Plaintiff and against 
Defendant Dale Gurley in the amount of $3,289.00, representing the 
fair and reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time in 
searching the records of the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts, 
writing correspondence to counsel requesting voluntary compliance 
with Rule 11 and in filing and briefing the motion granted herein. 
4. It is further ordered, pursuant to provisions of Rule 
4-505(3), Rules of Judicial Administration, that this order shall 
be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees 
expended in collecting said amount awarded as sanctions by 
execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED this J>/ jfaay of January, 1992. 
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Address of Judgment Debtor: 
Dale M. Gurley 
328 North 700 East 
Payson, Utah 84651 
Social Security No. (unknown) 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 3 rd day of January, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER STRIKING AFFIDAVIT 
OF DALE GURLEY AND FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS was mailed first class, 
postage prepaid to: 
John P. Soltis 
Reed M. Stringham III 
Assistant Attorneys General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Petitioner, pro se 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DALE GURLEY, and the DIVISION OF 
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND 
TRAINING, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY, STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
ERRATA 
Civil No. 920355-CA 
Notice is hereby given of the following corrections of 
statutory citations in the brief of Petitioner-Appellant herein: 
1. Page 4, line 19, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)" should be 
"§ 63-46b-313J_(d) ." 
2. Page 4, line 34, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(e)* should be 
"§ 63-46b-3ill(e)." 
3. Page 5, line 9, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8" should be 
"§ 63-46b-8m ." 
4. Page 6, line 9, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(e)(iii)" 
should be "§ 63-46b-3(3)(e)(iii)." 
5. Page 13, line 9, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)" should be 
"§ 63-46b-3Xll(d)." 
6. Page 16, line 21, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)" should 
be "§ 63-46b-3(3)idl." 
7. Page 17, line 10, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)" should 
be "§ 63-46b-3(3)(d)." 
8. Page 19, line 5, "subdivision (d) of Section 3" should be 
"Section 3(3)." 
9. Page 20, line 16, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)(ii) 
should be "§ 63-46b-3(3)(d)(ii)." 
10. Page 20, line 24, "purpose of said § 3(d)(ii)" should be 
"§ 3(3)(d)(ii)." 
11. Page 21, line 9, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)(ii)" 
should be "§ 63-46b-3X2±(d)(ii)." 
12. Page 21, line 16, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)" should 
be "§ 63-46b-313_l(d) ." 
13. Page 22, line 28, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3" should be 
"§ 63-46b-3131." 
14. Page 29, line 4, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)" should be 
"§ 63-46b-3!31(d)." 
15. Page 30, second line from the bottom, "Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-8(d)" should be "§ 63-46b-8(l)(d)." 
Request is hereby made to make the foregoing corrections by 
interlineation, under the supervision of the Clerk of the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of November, 1992. 
/PARKER M. NIELSON 
Attorney for Petitioner-
Appellant, pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ERRATA was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, this 2nd day of 
November, 1992 to: 
(0637) 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Richard D. Wyss 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
236 State Capitol 
S a l t Lake City/^CJT 84114 
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